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THE ETHICAL, GOVERNMENTAL, AND ECONOMIC 
ELEMENTS OF SECESSION 
 
Fred E. Foldvary* 
 
Introduction 
Secession is a withdrawal of persons, space, and goods from the 
jurisdiction of the original governing unit.  Let the seceding entity be called 
the "new realm" and the entity it withdraws from be called the "old realm." 
Such withdrawal and disassociation implies issues of ethics, 
governance, and economics that are interrelated, and are most meaningfully 
treated as an integrated foundational theory of secession.  This foundation 
creates a benchmark, which can be applied flexibly to actual ethnic and 
territorial conflicts.  While the ideal benchmark is itself usually politically 
infeasible, it nevertheless can play a key role in presenting the direction 
towards reform most consistent with ethical standards, rights-protecting 
governance, and sound economic policy. 
Universal ethics and secession 
If there is no ethic that transcends culture and applies universally to 
humanity, then the question of secession, as with other political topics, is 
simply one of power and desire.  There could be analysis on practical 
matters, but in the end, governance would be emptied of any quest for justice. 
People do, for the most part, sense that there is such as a thing as morality 
beyond personal views, and such has been the topic of inquiry among moral 
philosophers since antiquity. 
There are perhaps many paths towards a universal ethic; the one taken 
here is in the tradition of the natural-law philosophers of the European 
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enlightenment and Age of Reason, especially that of John Locke.  In his 
Second Treatise (1690), Locke wrote that there exists a law of nature that can 
be derived using reason: "being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, property, health, and possessions." 
Locke's harm rule can be reformulated into basic rules for a universal 
ethic, which omit the redundant terminology of "ought" and also includes the 
good, as follows (Foldvary, 1980): 
1. Acts are evil if and only if they initiate invasive and coercive harm 
    to others; 
2. Acts are good if they are welcomed benefits to others; and 
3. All other acts are neutral. 
Note that the avoidance of good acts is not an evil, so that a person is 
ethical if he refrains from committing evil.  A person is virtuous if he does 
moral good, but doing good is not a moral obligation. 
If this universal ethic is indeed the unique moral imperative for 
humanity, it forms the moral basis of proper governance.  Government is 
only morally legitimate to the degree that its laws and policies are in accord 
with the universal ethic. 
The universal ethic also gives meaning to moral rights (human rights 
and natural rights being synonyms of the moral rights determined by the 
universal ethic).  A person has a moral right to X if (and only if) the negation 
of X is morally evil.  For example, the right to own property implies that it is 
evil for others to steal that property.  That one has a right to free speech 
implies that it is evil for others to negate that speech, such as by prohibiting 
and punishing it. 
The universal ethic also gives meaning to the concept of liberty.  A 
society has political liberty and is a truly free society if its laws fully 
implement the universal ethic and do not go beyond it.  Within a constitution 
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based on the universal ethic, an organization may do whatever its members 
voluntarily consent to.  Thus, churches or associations may enact arbitrary 
restrictions, but only if entry into and exit from such organization is 
voluntary. 
The Ethical Implications for Governance 
The ultimate elements of ethics, governance, and economics are 
persons and land.  All goods are produced from these original factors.  The 
relationship of persons to one another and to land is the essence of the 
secession question.  Title to key monuments and buildings can also be an 
important issue, of course, but, as the saying goes, they come with the 
territory. 
Taking the premise of human equality, in the Lockean and 
Jeffersonian sense of equal human worth (not outcomes), to its logical 
conclusion, there is no ethical basis for any one human being imposing rule 
on another unwilling equal human being (aside from children and the 
mentally incompetent, topics that will not be dealt with here).  Therefore, all 
governance must morally be voluntary.  Any imposition of rule on an 
unwilling subject is an invasion into his domain, hence morally evil.  Moral 
equality implies that all persons are equal self-owners. 
Imposed rule makes the ruler master and the ruled, to some degree, a 
slave, in contrast to the equality premise from with the universal ethic 
derives.  Only if a person commits an act of coercive harm does he 
legitimately fall within the jurisdiction of others, and even then, only to the 
degree necessary to obtain restitution and to protect society from threats from 
this person. 
All associations must therefore have an exit option in order to be 
morally ethical, i.e. not evil. The laws of marriage must allow for divorce.  
The laws of employment must allow employees to leave and employers to 
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terminate employees.  And, the laws of community must allow members to 
have one or more exit options.  As James Buchanan (1996) has stated, the 
availability of the exit option limits the ability of governments to exploit 
residents, and the internal and external exit options also induce more efficient 
governance and public finances. 
Except in totalitarian states, people have been free to emigrate and 
change citizenship, the external exit option.  But a second option, the internal 
exit, is to withdraw from the jurisdiction of an association or government 
without moving out.  That option requires an analysis of land. 
The Ethics and Economics of Land 
The classical economic meaning of "land" includes all natural 
resources and all natural opportunities.  "Natural" means anything prior to 
and apart from human action.  Types of land include real-estate space (the 
three-dimensional usable space at, above, and below the surface of the earth), 
materials in their natural state (e.g. undiscovered oil in the ground), the 
electro-magnetic spectrum, water as provided by nature, wildlife, and the 
genetic endowment of the earth (all the varieties of genetic programming). 
The most relevant type of land in the secession question is that of real 
estate space and the important material resources in a particular place.  Let us 
first focus on real-estate space. 
The ownership of any asset consists of a bundle of rights.  The two 
key bundle categories are rights of possession, including rights of use and 
transfer, and rights to the return or yield of the asset. These two bundles are 
separable.  A tenant, for example, is granted some rights of possession for a 
certain time interval in exchange for payments to the title holder, who retains 
the rights to the yield, i.e. the rental. 
 
I turn again to John Locke for the ethical basis of the ownership of 
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land.  Locke stated that one may appropriate unclaimed land for one's use, 
with the proviso that land of equal quality is freely available for others.  
Nobody is harmed by a claim of exclusive title to previously unclaimed land 
if one can obtain free land of the same quality elsewhere. 
The Lockean proviso implies that if land of similar quality is no 
longer free, one's title is placed in moral doubt.  The land now has an 
economic rent, meaning that it potentially can earn a return to the title holder. 
 Who then has the rights of possession and of the rent? 
Land is a necessary factor of production; all economic activity must 
take place in space, and uses goods ultimately taken from material natural 
resources.  Rights of possession are therefore necessary if one is to exercise 
one's self-ownership and engage in labor to produce wealth.  Property rights 
of possession facilitate the exchange to land to those putting it to most 
productive use.  What is not necessary is a title to the economic rent of land.  
By economic definition, economic rent is that portion of the yield not needed 
to put the factor of production into effective use.  All pure land rent 
(exclusive of the value of improvements that attach to land) is economic rent, 
since the land is always, already, there by nature.  The pure land rent of space 
arises from the natural advantages of a location and from the demand due to 
population and commerce, apart from any labor and capital goods provided 
by title holders.  Thus, the payment of rent has no disincentive effects and 
does not increase the rent. 
To grant the economic rent of land to whoever happens to have 
acquired land would be an arbitrarily unequal privilege to first comers or 
heirs of conquerors.  The premise of moral equality implies that all pure land 
rent be the equal property of all human beings on earth, as the least arbitrary 
assignation of the rent. 
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The separation of the rights to the rent and of possession has very 
practical applications.  Consider a territory where oil is located in the new 
realm, which secedes from the old realm.  The officials of the old realm 
would resist secession in part because the oil resources would be transferred 
to the new realm.  But if the secession agreement specifies that the rent from 
the oil be shared on an equal per-capita basis, then much of the sting is 
removed from the secession, since the economic benefits of the oil are 
reflected in the rent, which the old realm will have a share of.  In effect, the 
residents of the new realm compensate those of the old realm for the removal 
of that share of the natural resource. 
The shared rent can also serve as a primary source of public revenue, 
making it possible to reduce taxes, which have a disincentive effect.  Henry 
George (1879 [1975]) proposed that all public goods could be financed from 
economic land rent, making possible the abolition of other taxation.  But 
even if other taxes remain, or all the rent is not tapped for public finance, to 
the degree that rent is collected, the economies of the realms will benefit 
from the reduction of the excess burdens of taxes such as on income, sales, 
and value added. 
Whereas the discussion here is centered on territorial communities, 
Gordon Tullock (1985) and others have proposed also non-territorial 
constitutions for contractual associations.  Tullock notes the example of the 
Millet system of the old Turkish empire, under which autonomous 
non-Muslim religious communities were formed.  Tullock proposes 
"associations with quasi governmental power," which would be "without a 
geographic 'locality.'"   They would provide services that are not 
geographical in scope, somewhat like what churches provide today.  Aspects 
of law which these "sociological" associations could assume could include 
those concerned with family, probate, and contract. 
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A Benchmark Model of Righteous Secession 
Posit an old realm "A" with citizens "C;" for simplicity, all residents 
will be considered citizens.  A subset of citizens "b" wish to secede and form 
a new realm "B," while the complement subset "a" wish to remain citizens of 
the old realm. 
One of the typical problems with secession is that unless Cb forms a 
compact contiguous territory, there will be Ca interspersed within the 
territory of B, and if the whole territory secedes, this is involuntarily imposed 
on Ca.  Such forced secession would be just as much an imposition, and 
equally unjust, as the prevention of the secession of the Cb. 
One possibility would be for the contiguous territory of B to secede, 
but with Ca retaining citizenship in A.  But then the question is, would the 
laws of B apply to Ca?  There could be some body of law and policy that 
would not apply to Ca, such as schooling and family law.  But much of 
policy, such as criminal law and taxation, usually would, because in law and 
historically, territory has trumped citizenship, aside from exceptions such as 
diplomats and, in some cases, religious figures.  Non-citizen residents of the 
USA are subject to American and State laws.  Some laws apply to citizens 
regardless of location; for example, US citizens abroad are subject to US 
income taxation and have the right to vote in US elections.   
But most law and its enforcement is attached to territory.  If a 
criminal flees the US, he becomes outside the reach of US law enforcement 
unless there is some agreement between the foreign country and the US, in 
which case it is still the authority of the foreign country that has jurisdiction 
in allowing US law enforcement to enter.  All residents must usually pay the 
taxes imposed in the jurisdiction.  Most culturally-aligned law is confined to 
a territorial jurisdiction.  For example, California prohibits gambling within 
its territory, but cannot prevent its residents from gambling outside the 
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boundaries of California.  The US federal government prohibits some 
medical procedures, which US citizens can obtain abroad. 
Because much law and policy is territorial, the citizens of A located 
in B could find little comfort in remaining Ca.  They would vote in the 
elections for A, but would have to live under B rules which they not only 
disagree with but would have no vote voice with which to oppose them. 
The option which would prevent involuntary rule would be to allow 
land titles held by Ca to remain in A if the title holder so desired.  
Landowners who did not wish to secede would keep their land in the old 
realm A.  The seceding territory would consist only of the lands under the 
title of Cb, those wishing to be in B, plus some share of the governmental 
land. 
Let us first ignore governmental land and assume all land is under 
private title.  The new realm B would consist only of the land whose titles are 
held by landowners wishing to secede.  In addition, tenants who rent and 
don't own land could secede their citizenship and be citizens of B residing in 
A.  If the landlord wishes to remain in A and the tenant wishes to be in B, the 
rights of possession of the land lord would prevail with respect to the 
territory.   
This territorial division only holds for the rights of possession and the 
legal jurisdiction over the territory, which itself is also a governmental right 
of possession.  In this benchmark model, the economic land rent of all the 
land in A and B would be the property of all the residents of A and B with 
equal per-capita shares.  A and B could form a confederation A+B that would 
collect the rent and then distribute it either to the individual citizens as a 
dividend (as in fact Alaska does with its oil royalty revenue) or to the 
governments of A and B in proportion to their populations, or a mixture of 
the two.  If the governments obtain the rent, it could replace taxes on labor 
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and capital, reducing the tax burdens of the citizens and industry.  The 
confederation could also set up courts to resolve disputes between citizens of 
A and B, and have title to some disputed areas. 
It should be emphasized, for clarity, that the rent paid to the 
confederation would be only for pure land, and not for any improvements to 
land, so that any value derived from buildings, infrastructure, and land-
shaping (draining, flattening) would not be included in the land rent. 
The secession only of landholders wishing to secede could create a 
checkerboard pattern of jurisdiction, which some may find problematic.  But 
fragmented jurisdiction already exists in several areas and works well.  For 
example, Vatican City is an independent country within Rome, with 
agreements with Italy for various services, and Monaco is a tiny independent 
State next to France, which does not seem to present any difficulties.  In 
Washington DC, the federal government administers some of the territory 
while the city government has home rule over the rest; indeed, the federal 
territory itself is split among the branches of government.  West Berlin was 
under the occupation of three countries while having its own local municipal 
government. 
Thus, fractures land jurisdiction can be dealt with by having a joint 
municipal or regional government under the jurisdiction of both A and B, as 
well as mutual agreements for services, as cities do when they permit police 
and other services from neighboring cities to enter and contract out services 
from neighboring municipalities. 
Moreover, any difficulties encountered with fragmented jurisdiction 
would be self-correcting in the market for governance.  If an isolated 
landowner would face difficulties seceding to B, then this is a cost of 
secession that would be weighed against the benefits, and if the cost is too 
high, he would not secede.  Thus, that secession that takes place would have 
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benefits that exceed the costs for the owners; otherwise, it would not take 
place. 
Another objection to secession by landownership is that titles to land 
are not absolutes but are functions of legal jurisdictions, so that land titles 
originate with the governmental state rather than in a state of nature.  But as 
argued above, the imposition of rule without consent itself violates equal 
rights, and the rights of possession could be universally recognized, 
worldwide, so long as the rent is paid to humanity.  In this Lockean 
interpretation, rightful title comes from the compensation to humanity of the 
rent regardless of who has the title so long as there was no force or fraud in 
obtaining the title, or if past conquests can no longer be reversed in any 
practical manner. 
Given the secession of those landowners wishing to be in the new 
realm, what would happen if landowner Cb sells the property to a new owner 
who prefers to be in A?  The secession agreement should allow the new 
owner to switch affiliation to A, so that the governance remains voluntary.  
Possibly, for administrative convenience, such shifts in jurisdiction could be 
made once annually or according to some schedule. 
Now we can turn to the question of land under the title of the 
government of the old realm.  If the territory of B is somewhat contiguous, 
governmental land within it should be transferred to B.  Also, if a majority of 
the population or most of the land area in some recognized jurisdiction such 
as a city or province is in B, the governmental land should go to B.  But if the 
jurisdiction is not clear, then the governmental lands that are ambiguous 
could be split among A and B according to the proportion of land value 
corresponding to the populations.  If, say, A has one third of the population 
of A+B, then it could obtain one third of the government-held land value. 
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If B obtains less than its proportional share of land value, it is not that 
much of a disadvantage, since A will be paying rent to the common pool of 
A+B, and B will be compensated for any land it does not possess by getting 
its share of the rent. 
Besides land, the old realm has capital goods, such as military bases, 
and liabilities, such as government bonds and social security liabilities.  
Justice and neutrality require that the new realm take with it its share of the 
national debt and be compensated if it does not obtain its population share of 
key governmental assets such as military bases and equipment.  The rent 
payments can be used for such compensation so that payments come from 
future rental income rather than adding to current debt. 
Secession in Governance 
Secession is not just a means of creating new countries, but can 
become a central element in governance in general.  The general principle is 
that at any level of government, lower-level governments or individual 
residents may secede in part or in whole.   
Suppose some residents of a city are not satisfied with their city's 
government school system.  They would be able to withdraw from the city 
school district and either form their own district under the State school 
system or create a private school.  They would also no longer have the tax 
liabilities that were formerly directed towards the city school district.  If one 
secedes from some government service or jurisdiction, one also becomes 
exempt from its taxation.  Parents who remove their children from the 
government school system and pay tuition to a private school would have a 
tax credit for that tuition and other school expenses, up to the governmental 
per-student average.  Alternatively, some proportion of the property (real-
estate) tax could be reduced. 
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Similarly, residents could substitute private garbage collection for the 
city service, or privatize their streets as some neighborhoods have done in St. 
Louis (Foldvary, 1994).  Such service substitution would be accompanied by 
tax substitution.  Such substitutive secession would promote more efficient 
and less interventionist government, as residents would be more able to 
choose their governance, promoting competition among governments for 
residents and their tax monies. 
Beyond such partial secession, households could also secede entirely 
from the city or county and form new jurisdictions.  For administrative 
convenience, the seceding households could be grouped together as a new 
county.  The official boundaries of cities and counties need not change; the 
seceding entities could be independent in substance as autonomous districts, 
while still formally remaining part of the jurisdiction on the map. 
As analyzed by Buchanan (1991), a constitution would set forth only 
procedural requirements for withdrawal, not requiring any substantive 
grounds to justify the secession.  The procedure would include the payment 
of mutual obligations, like a fair-property settlement in a divorce (p. 133), 
including a possible exit fee. 
The sovereign levels of government, such as the United States and the 
50 States, could retain "residual sovereignty."  For example, if a person 
withdrew his land from the jurisdiction of both Virginia and the U.S.A., both 
could still claim to have nominal jurisdiction so far as the international and 
federal boundaries were concerned, but they would exercise no power within 
the seceding area except by contract.  
If such secession options were universal for all jurisdictions within a 
country, it would shift power from top-down central control to bottom-up 
citizen empowerment.  Corrupt and abusive officials would find themselves 
ruling over city hall but no residents or businesses, and be left with no tax 
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revenue. 
A more radical structure of governance would place the initial 
political power at the neighborhood level.  An association of neighborhood 
councils would elect the city government, and any neighborhood district 
would be able to secede entirely from the city.  City councils would then 
elect representatives to a county government, and the county boards would 
send representatives to the State legislature.  The States or provinces would 
then elect the federal or national parliament or congress.  The direct election 
of officials at many levels would be replaced by multi-level governance 
where each level is elected by the next lower level, the citizens voting only 
for their neighborhood level. 
Rather than losing political clout from not directly voting for the top 
officials, citizens would gain a great deal of leverage.  If no favorable action 
is forthcoming at the top level, the residents would recall their local council.  
Fear of recall would spur the council to push for action at the next higher 
level, on up to the top.  The small population of the local neighborhood 
would make the local council accessible and easily monitored. 
Added to this multi-level voice option would be the secession option, 
where districts at any level would be able to secede from the level above it 
and create a new higher-level council.  The result would be a flexible market 
for legislation with consent enabled by three methods: voting, emigration, 
and secession. 
Applications to Territorial Conflicts 
The elements of the benchmark secession model include:  1) 
individual choice of citizenship; 2) secession by title holders of land; 3) 
confederal governance and joint sovereignty; 4) retaining nominal boundaries 
and sovereignty but with substantive autonomy for new realms; 5) sharing of 
the land rent among all residents. 
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The following cases show how the elements of secession can be 
applied to some real-world conflicts.  For a more detailed list of secessionist 
regions and their characteristics, see Bookman (1992). 
Israel and Palestine 
The Palestinian Arabs are attempting to secede from the State of 
Israel.  For decades the Israeli Jews and the Palestinian Arabs have been 
engaged in a struggle for land.  The elements of the benchmark model 
presented above could greatly facilitate a settlement.  Israel and Palestine 
would be territories and governments under a confederation.  All landholders, 
including governments, would pay a market rent to the confederation for all 
land held.  The confederation would take title to the most disputed areas, 
such as the Temple Mount at Jerusalem.  The confederation could also take 
title to water resources.   
The payment of rent by those possessing land would compensate the 
residents of the other side.  All residents in Israel and Palestine would be able 
to choose their citizenship, so that Arabs within the pre-1967 borders could 
choose to be citizens of Palestine, while the Jewish settlers in Judea and 
Samaria (the West Bank) would remain citizens of Israel.  There could be 
joint sovereignty by Israel and Palestine over some disputed areas.  With 
citizenship by choice, Israel would have less to fear from the return of 
Palestinian exiles, since they would not be voting citizens of Israel. 
Eventually, other parties within the confederation could secede and 
create new member states.  For example, there could be a Christian-based 
country as a third member if the Palestinian State becomes exclusively 
Islamic.  There could also be secession from Israel by Jews who are not 
satisfied with their government, give up on changing it by the voting process, 
and form a new autonomous entity under the confederation.  The formal 
boundaries of Israel could remain intact, the seceding realm becoming a fully 
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autonomous district with its own representation in the federation. 
Northern Ireland 
The troubles that have kept Northern Ireland in conflict could be 
resolved with joint sovereignty by both the UK and Ireland, the individual 
residents being able to choose citizenship in either.  Under joint rule there 
would be a Northern Ireland confederation with Irish and British members 
according to the desires of the landowners, who would pay rent to the 
confederation.  Ethnic Irish residents could thus secede from the UK and 
become Irish citizens and members of the Irish province of the Northern 
Ireland confederation, while the Protestants could remain British. 
Quebec 
Quebec province, Canada, presents a typical case of an ethnic group, 
many of whose members desire to secede and become independent, while 
substantial minorities within the province, especially the First Nations 
peoples and the English-language speakers, wish to remain within Canada.  If 
the majority in Quebec wishes to secede, the benchmark model could be 
applied by preserving the nominal boundaries of an independent Quebec.  
But the First Nations group within Quebec, which desire to remain in 
Canada, would be autonomous and, if they wish, affiliated with Canada.  
English-speaking and other residents who desire would remain citizens of 
Canada, and their land titles would be collectively an autonomous English 
territory, possibly affiliated with Canada.  The English and First Nations 
residents would obtain a proportional amount of the land rent of Quebec, thus 
benefiting from their population share of the governmental lands. 
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Yugoslavia 
The current governing structures in Bosnia and Kosovo are not 
working well because minorities are forced to be under the authority of other 
ethnic regimes.  The benchmark model could be applied in Bosnia to create a 
confederation with Muslim, Serb, Croatian, and possibly other members, 
each territory made up of the chosen affiliations of the landowners.  All 
landowners, including governments, would pay a market rent to the 
confederation for lands held.  No citizen would then be under involuntary 
rule by alien ethnic overlords. 
In Kosovo, also, there would be a confederation in which the ethnic 
Serbs would have their own government.  Eventually, most of the former 
Yugoslavia could again merge into one confederation, only this time; 
membership in the constituent nations would be by the chosen affiliation of 
each citizen.  The Serbs in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, etc., would most likely 
choose to all be in one Serb nation within the confederation, satisfying the 
desire for one Serb nation, but without imposing it on unwilling non-Serbs.  
Perhaps the Gypsies and ethnic Hungarians would form their own nations 
within the new Yugoslav confederation.   
Kashmir 
Kashmir likewise has been in conflict between India and Pakistan 
since their independence.  As with Northern Ireland, India and Pakistan could 
have joint sovereignty over Kashmir, each resident being free to choose his 
citizenship.  A Kashmirian confederation would have two or more nations 
administering their local functions such as schooling. 
Chechnya 
The Chechen problem is one most Russians would be glad to solve 
short of complete independence.  Russians fear the dissolution of what is in 
effect a Russian empire over many ethnic groups.  Realistically, the Russian 
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government is not likely to give up much power to its federal republic and 
regions.  But Chechnya and some other peoples could be offered genuine 
autonomy, including the right to have their own currency and foreign 
relations, short of formal independence.  Formal institutions often offer the 
emotional need to maintain territorial integrity felt by citizens of an old realm 
even when they lack substance.  As a legal fiction, Chechnya would remain a 
republic within the Russian federation.  But they would have de-facto 
sovereignty within some limitations, such as limited military power, under an 
agreement with Russia. 
China 
The governing officials of China are attempting to bring Taiwan 
under their rule, having taken back Hong Kong and Macau.  The desire of 
many Chinese for a united China could be satisfied without depriving the 
Taiwanese of their democracy and market economy restoring the Chinese 
empire as a confederation.  They could call it the Commonwealth of China.  
The Commonwealth would have as members Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
Central China.  Each member nation would have self-governance, and all 
citizens of the Commonwealth would be able to choose their governmental 
affiliation.  Eventually, other parts of Central China would be able to become 
separate members of the Commonwealth.   
The first communist constitution of China in 1931 recognized the 
right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, including the 
right to become independent.  But after 1936 "there was no more mention of 
possible secession" (Bookman, 1992, p. 91). 
A Commonwealth of nations should satisfy the desire to bring the 
parts of the former Chinese empire together in one greater China, but with 
self-governance for the residents of Taiwan and Hong Kong and national 
minorities.  Once the Commonwealth is established, international and 
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domestic pressure could convince the governing officials of Central China to 
let Tibet also become a separate member.  Taiwan and Hong Kong would be 
part of China but not under the rule of Central China. 
Rwanda 
Unitary governance has failed in Rwanda, as the Hutu and Tutsi have 
each sought to dominate the government.  A confederation of Hutu and Tutsi 
national governments would let each ethnic group be self-governing, and 
their territories would be made up of the landholdings of the members, along 
with shares of the governmental lands.  The sharing of the rent would reduce 
the desire of both groups to grab land, since it would have a carrying cost. 
Kurdistan 
The Kurds have had the misfortune of being split among several 
countries, mainly Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.  Their desire to become one country 
involves irredentism rather than pure secession, i.e. the desire to merge with 
peoples in other countries and transfer territory from the other state to a new 
state or different state.  A Kurdistan could be created having joint 
sovereignty with these three countries; hence, Turkish Kurdistan would be 
under joint sovereignty with Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan with Iraq, and Iranian 
Kurdistan with Iran.  The rent would be split in each of the three territories 
with both governments.  Citizens in each would be free to choose their 
citizenship.  If outright independence is politically infeasible, then the 
autonomous Kurdish regions of the three countries could still be united under 
a Kurdish confederation of the three, with some governmental functions. 
Conclusion 
If human rights have any significant universal meaning, it is only 
within a universal ethic that transcends culture and personal viewpoints.  The 
equality premise from which this ethic is derived requires the equal 
sovereignty of each person, hence each person choosing his governmental 
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affiliation.  The equality premise applied to land provides for individual 
possession of land but equal shares of its rent.  Applied to secession, each 
person has a moral right to the governance of his choice, and the several 
governments in a region can be under a confederation that collects the rent 
and coordinates inter-governmental affairs.  Confederation keeps 
governmental economies of scale and scope, while leaving individuals free to 
live among their own ethnic and cultural rules. 
Territorial and ethnic conflicts can be resolved flexibly by applying 
the concepts of confederation and choice in governance.  The concepts of 
joint sovereignty and formal jurisdictions can facilitate compromises that 
leave ethnic groups with independence in practice if not in full form, and 
leave disputed territories in the possession of both parties.  The payment of 
rent is the economic compromise of compensating others for loss of 
possession, the rent being fungible where land is not. 
These elements of governance – confederation, joint sovereignty, 
citizenship by choice, substantive independence, and rent sharing – will not 
be easy to implement, and will be resisted, but they deserve to have a place in 
public and scholarly dialog as workable alternatives to otherwise intractable 
problems that have resisted other solutions. 
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